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This Article discusses the validity of issuing patents for genetically 
engineered (GE) traits for plants. These patent applications present the 
USPTO with the issue of authorizing patents that have an ability to 
create significant detrimental effects on the environment and uncharted 
risks to health. The patents allow control over enormous segments of 
world agriculture. Invalidity arises from the utility standard in the Patent 
Statute. 
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KEITH 1/10/2012  9:11 AM 
436 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 26, 435 
I 
THE WARNINGS OF HARMS ARISING FROM ISSUING PATENTS FOR 
GENES ON FORMS OF LIFE RAISED BY THE PATENT OFFICE IN THE 
CHAKRABARTY CASE HAVE BECOME PROPHETIC 
A.  The Failures 
Three postpatent failures of GE plant traits bring to the forefront the 
allowance of patents for them. These patents ignore environmental 
consequences that arise when working with genes to be inserted into the 
plant nucleus.1 The example trait involved here, increased tolerance to 
glyphosate, is engineered from a gene contained in a bacterium and 
forced into the host plant. The inserted gene encodes a special enzyme 
(Class II EPSPS). The enzyme makes plants resistant to herbicides. It 
allows the patent holder, Monsanto, to profit from the purchase of two 
of its commercial products—Roundup, for use with the patented plant, 
and patented seeds. The asserted benefit from the purchase of Roundup 
is the elimination of a number of weed species without injury to the 
patented crop. Roundup contains approximately forty-one percent 
glyphosate and inert chemicals, including surfactants (discussed below). 
Transgenic patents seek approval of claims to intellectual property 
that oversee vast environmental and social changes. Warnings of 
hazards from genetic engineering appeared in the briefs of the petitioner, 
Commissioner of Trademarks and Patents, and amicus curiae in 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty.2 
The first failure was the appearance of a variety of superweeds on 
U.S. farmlands following a dramatic rise in the use of Monsanto’s 
Roundup. It became by far the leading herbicide; glyphosate usage in 
 
1 Second Declaration of Paulette Pierson, Ph.D., In Support of Memorandum at ¶ 35, 
Geertson Seed Farms v. Mike Johanns, No. C-06-1075 CRB (N.D. Cal. 2007) (222a) 
[hereinafter Second Declaration]. 
Herbicide tolerant weeds are neither a new phenomenon nor 
exclusively restricted to glyphosate. In 1957, the first herbicide 
resistant weed was identified in the U.S.—spreading dayflower 
resistant to 2, 4-D, a synthetic auxin, identified in Hawaii. There are 
currently 119 weed biotypes in the United States that are resistant to 
one or more herbicides. Of the herbicide resistant biotypes in the 
United States, thirty-eight weeds have biotypes that are resistant to 
ALS herbicides, twenty-three weeds are resistant to triazine 
herbicides, while only seven weeds have developed biotypes resistant 
to glyphosate in the United States. This low risk for weed resistance 
is based on several factors. 
Compare her limited tolerant numbers with the references in Barrie, infra note 4. 
2 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
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the United States rose from 7,933,189 pounds for soybeans, corn, and 
cotton in 1994 to 119,071,000 pounds in 2005.3 
Monsanto introduced the patented glyphosate tolerant (GT) soybean 
seed and plant for full utilization in 1996. Monsanto adopted various 
marketing strategies to enhance its sales of Roundup for use with its 
patented seeds. A lawsuit filed by organic farmers and seed companies 
asserts that Monsanto genes are in eighty-five to ninety percent of the 
country’s soybean, sugar beet, corn, cotton, and canola plants.4 It is 
estimated that superweeds will appear on forty percent of domestic 
farmlands planted for corn and soybeans by the middle of the decade.5 
Farmer groups report that 103 biotypes of weeds within sixty-three 
weed species have herbicide resistance.6 Superweeds have spread to 
more than twenty-two states in which corn, cotton, and soybean are 
raised.7 One of the weeds, pigweed, is so tough that farmers complain 
that it damages parts of cotton picking equipment. Monsanto has granted 
corn farmers who purchased its GT seeds twelve dollars per acre 
payment to compensate for the cost of other herbicides.8 
The second failure involves the controversy of gene flow from GE 
plants. Organic farmers claim that Roundup Ready Alfalfa (RRA) gene 
flow will make their crops ineligible as organic product. In Monsanto 
Co. v. Geertson, organic farmers brought a case involving alleged 
contamination from Monsanto’s patented RRA.9 This case is addressed 
in the section immediately below. A similar action has also been filed in 
 
3 CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, GENETICALLY MODIFIED (GM) CROPS AND PESTICIDE 
USE  (Jan. 2008). The 2006 poundage for soybean alone was 96,725,000 pounds. 
4 F.W. Barrie, A Band of 60 Davids Challenges Monsanto, the Goliath, in Federal Court, 
OSGATA.ORG (May 27, 2011), http://knowwhereyourfoodcomesfrom.com/2011/05/27/a-band 
-of-60-davids-challenges-monsanto-the-goliath-in-federal-court/. 
5 Scott Kilman, Superweed Outbreak Triggers Arms Race, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2010, at 
A16. 
6 Roy Roberson, Glyphosate Resistant Weeds a Reality for Cotton Growers, 
SOUTHEAST FARM PRESS (Feb. 10, 2006, 9:50 AM), http://southeastfarmpress.com 
/glyphosate-resistant-weeds-reality-cotton-growers. 
7 William Newman & Andrew Pollack, Farmers Cope With Roundup-Resistant Weeds, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010, at B1. 
8 Id.; Vandana Shiva, Superweeds, Super Pests, and Super Profits, INFOCHANGE NEWS 
& FEATURES (Sept. 2011), http://infochangeindia.org/environment/analysis/superweeds      
-superpests-and-superprofits.html. 
9 Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, et al., No.C-06-1075 (N.D.Cal.2006), aff’d, Monsanto 
Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, et al., 570 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2743 
(2010). 
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federal court over the genetic engineering consequences of sugar beets.10 
Sugar beet planting has recently been subject to deregulation. 
A third failure results from the inability to detect RRA seed in seed 
lots. A study from the Union of Concerned Scientists demonstrates 
the concern over contamination.11 Any plant subject to widespread 
acreage places thousands of tons of RRA seeds on the market even at 
a one-half to one percent rate of contamination.12 The study 
concluded that traditional varieties of “corn, soybeans, and canola are 
pervasively contaminated with low levels of DNA sequences derived 
from transgenic varieties.”13 
B.  The Geertson Case 
The Geertson case involved genetically engineered alfalfa. It 
considered the application of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 4331–4335 (1970) (NEPA) over the regulation of GE plant 
traits by federal agencies. NEPA places duties on the federal 
government to use all practical means consistent with other essential 
considerations of national policy to safeguard the environment. 
42 U.S.C. § 4331 provides, in part: 
(b)  In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the 
continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all 
practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of 
national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, 
programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may— 
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the 
environment for succeeding generations; 
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and 
esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings; 
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment 
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable 
and unintended consequences; 
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our 
national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment 
which supports diversity and variety of individual choice; 
 
10 Ctr. for Food Safety v. Connor, No C08-00484 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2009). 
11 MARGARET MELLON AND JANE RUSSLER, GONE TO SEED, TRANSGENIC 
CONTAMINANTS IN THE TRADITIONAL SEED SUPPLY (Union of Concerned Scientists 
2004), available at www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/food_and_agriculture/seedreport 
_fullreport.pdf. 
12 Id. at 2. 
13 Id. at 1. 
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(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which 
will permit high standards of living and wide sharing of life’s 
amenities; and 
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the 
maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources. 
(c) The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a 
healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility to 
contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment. 
Until 1986, all federal agencies applied a “worst case analysis.”14 
This analysis required an evaluation of the probability of worst-case 
occurrences that could result from the major action.15 The 1986 
amendment requires an evaluation of the reasonably foreseeable 
significant adverse impacts of a proposed action on the human 
environment. 
In 1981, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 
became the federal agency involved with regulating genetically 
engineered plants. Its powers included the regulation of substances that 
create plant pests under the Plant Protection Act.16 APHIS failed to 
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before allowing the 
deregulation of Roundup Ready Alfalfa (RRA), the genetically 
engineered plant tolerant to glyphosate.17 Alfalfa is not thought to have a 
problem with windblown pollen. However, bees and insects can carry 
RRA pollen, distributing it onto other fields and causing contamination. 
Nationwide planting of RRA was halted by the district court until 
APHIS prepared an EIS under NEPA, subject to the grandfather 
inclusion.18 The district court found that there was a sufficient showing 
of immediate harm to support an injunction.19 The district court also 
concluded that the problem of resistant weeds needed to be addressed.20 
The Supreme Court, over the dissent of Justice Stevens, remanded 
and dissolved the injunction to allow APHIS to consider partial 
deregulation.21 The Court ruled that an injunction does not automatically 
follow from the failure to have prepared an EIS.22 It held that a court of 
 
14 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1985) (amended 1986). 
15 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 347 (1989). 
16 7 U.S.C. § 7711(a) (2006). 
17 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2749–50. 
18 Id. at 2749. 
19 Id. at 2751. 
20 Id. at 2763 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
21 Id. at 2761–62. 
22 Id. at 2758. 
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equity may not act before the details of the specific partial deregulation 
are before it.23 The Court thus bypassed the impact of the district court’s 
findings. 
Justice Stevens’s dissent urged that the majority opinion should not 
ignore the factual findings of the district court. The dissent begins as 
follows: 
The Court does not dispute the District Court’s critical findings of 
fact: First, Roundup Ready Alfalfa (RRA) can contaminate other 
plants. Second, even planting in a controlled setting had led to 
contamination in some instances. Third, the Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has limited ability to monitor or 
enforce limitation on planting. And fourth, genetic contamination 
from RRA could decimate farmers’ livelihoods and the American 
alfalfa market for years to come.24 
The dissent asserted that, in light of the findings of fact by the district 
court, the injunction against partial deregulation should stand.25 It should 
have been viewed as consistent with the broad environmental objectives 
of NEPA.26 The Court cited Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources 
Council27 for the principle that NEPA requires an agency not to act upon 
“incomplete information, only to regret its decision after it is too late to 
correct.”28 Justice Stevens urged that any deregulation affecting gene 
transference requires an EIS.29 He viewed the guardianship of the public 
good as residing in the federal courts with their broad powers as courts 
of equity, in contrast to the exercise of power by the federal agency. 
Justice Stevens noted: 
While a court may not presume that a NEPA violation requires an 
injunction, it may take into account the principles embodied in the 
statute in considering whether an injunction would be appropriate. 
This District Court had before it strong evidence that gene 
transmission was likely to occur and that limits on growing could 
not be enforced. It also had a large amount of highly detailed 
evidence about whether growing restrictions, even if enforced, can 
prevent transmission. That evidence called into question the 
agency’s own claims regarding the risks posed by partial 
deregulation. In enjoining partial deregulation until it had the 
 
23 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2754. 
24 Id. at 2762. 
25 Id. at 2769. 
26 Id. at 2768. 
27 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989). 
28 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2768 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
29 Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.8, 1508.27(b)(4), (5)). 
KEITH 1/10/2012  9:11 AM 
2011] Transgenic Plants and Substantial Success 441 
benefit of an EIS to help parse the evidence, the court acted with 
exactly the sort of caution that Congress endorsed in NEPA.30 
Chances are that Justice Breyer, who recused himself, would have 
joined Justice Stevens.31 
APHIS’s GE approvals are often attacked for their the lack of 
scientific research.32 The organic community argues that partial 
deregulation of present GE traits cannot prevent contamination. The 
community is highly vocal in its concerns. Mr. Geertson stated: 
The arrogance of Monsanto, Forage Genetics and the USDA 
authorities supporting Monsanto is unbelievable! It is unjust and 
improper for them to suggest that conventional seed growers should 
move their farming operation to another location so Forage 
Genetics and Monsanto can raise RR alfalfa anywhere they want. 
Rather, if they want to commercialize this crop they need to require 
it be done in a manner that allows all farmers can continue to grow 
crops of their choice, without risk of contamination. The EIS 
refuses to even consider any such scenarios where such measures 
are required, let alone recommend they be required.33 
C.  Monsanto Patents 
The application for the patent allowing plants to withstand the 
herbicide glyphosate embraces DNA molecules, which encode an 
EPSPS enzyme. The EPSPS enzyme has the following described 
sequences: a recombinant, double-stranded DNA molecule 
comprising a promoter, which causes the production of RNA 
sequences that encode the EPSPS enzyme. The application claims 
methods of producing genetically transformed plants tolerant to 
glyphosate, the tolerant plant cells, seeds and plants, and the tolerant 
soybean and seed.34 
 
30 Id. at 2771–72. 
31 See Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983). 
32 Carey Gillam, Patents Trump Public Interest in Monsanto’s Ag Empire, REUTERS (Apr. 
13, 2010), www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/13/us-usa-gmos-regulators-idustr56e63c2aj 
200100413. 
33  Flaws in the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Roundup Ready Alfalfa, 
FARMWARS 5, http://farmwars.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/eis_problems.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
34 See U.S. Patent No. RE39247 (filed July 18, 2003). 
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D.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s Ruling on Patents from Forms of 
Life 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty was concerned with the allowance of 
patents for the engineering of oil-eating bacteria unknown to natural 
selection.35 The decision struck down two assertions: (1) modifications 
of life-forms are not allowable as patentable statutory subject matter and 
(2) Congress is the only branch equipped with the capacity to determine 
whether patents can be issued on altering forms of life.36 The Court, in a 
five to four opinion, held that the first issue was a narrow one of 
statutory interpretation.37 The Court held that there had never been a 
fixed rule precluding patents on living matter.38 As a matter of statutory 
construction, the congressional purpose of rewarding “invention” 
prevailed over the interpretation of the statute that did not recognize 
living matter as patentable subject matter. 
The Commissioner of Patents urged that congressional purpose is 
shown by the subsequent enactments of specific statutes covering the 
patenting of living plants (Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA)39 and 
Plant Patent Act (PPA)).40 The Commissioner urged there would have 
been no need for such specific authorizations for patents if the utility 
statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101, embraced living plants. The Court disagreed, 
determining that Congress passed the plant statutes for the narrow 
purpose of making certain that plant breeders had special patent 
protection.41 
The Court then went on to reject urgings by the Commissioner of 
Patents that the Court should defer to Congress. The Court ruled it had a 
constitutional duty to determine the scope of the general patent statute 
(35 U.S.C. § 101). The brief of the Solicitor General urged: 
Even if Congress were to limit its consideration of the desirability 
of extending patent protection to microorganisms, it would have to 
make difficult policy decisions with far-reaching effects. 
Chakrabarty’s discovery is closely related to recombinant DNA 
research and like that research involves “genetic engineering.”. . . 
 
35 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980). 
36 Id. at 314, 317–18. 
37 Id. at 307. 
38 See id. at 303. 
39 7 U.S.C. § 2321 (2006). 
40 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164(2006). 
41 See Diamond, 447 U.S. at 303. 
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Research in this area is already highly controversial, in part because 
of the potential hazards involved. Microorganisms with transplanted 
genes, if allowed to escape into the environment or to infect 
laboratory workers and others, could be hazardous to man or to 
other life forms. It was for this reason that the Director of the 
National Institutes of Health in 1976 released guidelines for NIH-
sponsored research on recombinant DNA that established controlled 
conditions under which such research was to be performed. 
Continuing controversy over the degree of governmental control of 
recombinant DNA research has resulted in revisions of these 
guidelines. 
One aspect of this controversy is the extent, if any, to which patent 
grants should be afforded on organisms that result from genetic 
engineering. Some persons believe that the ethical problems raised 
by creating the genetic material of life including human life-should 
not be compounded by providing that such life can be “owned” by 
patent holders. Others favor exploitation of this research under the 
patent system and suggest that the patent system might control 
public health risks. Yet others are skeptical of this claim and see the 
need for far more consideration of the relationship between patent 
law and genetic engineering. Resolution of such disputes is 
precisely the type of task for which Congress, and not the judiciary, 
is equipped.42 
II 
THE RAPID RACE TO PATENTABILITY 
A.  The White House 
Genetic engineering is said to have begun in 1972 upon the success 
of recombinant DNA technology, for which Herbert Boyer and 
Stanley Cohen ultimately received patents in 1980.43 By 1973, the 
prospect for a better world through biotechnology, including cures for 
illnesses and control of nature, was on the table.44 The desire to jump-
start projected successes collided with the need for a long-term 
scientific analysis of all the benefits and detriments. Paoletti and 
Pimental discuss this dilemma and have brought into focus proposed 
hurdles: 
Whitten (1992) proposes several essential characteristics that 
genetically engineered organisms must have if they are to be 
suitable for release in agriculture and the environment: They should 
 
42 Brief for the Petitioner at 18–20, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (No. 
79-136) (internal citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
43 See Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on Genetically 
Modified Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733 (2003). 
44 Id. 
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be environmentally safe, have limited impact on nontarget 
organisms, not be present in human food, not cause pest resistance, 
and be able to be withdrawn from the environment if ultimately 
required.45 
A major issue would be an allowance of patents for the jump-start. 
The executive branch in the mid-1980s initiated a push to develop 
standards to encourage the expenditure of significant funds for 
biotechnology, whether for plants or cures for humans. The Reagan 
administration created an interagency working group within the White 
House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), which 
began drafting an overall federal framework for biotechnology.46 In 
1984, the OSTP published the Coordinated Framework for Regulation 
of Biotechnology (Coordinated Framework). 
The 1984 publication of the Coordinated Framework set forth the 
view that biotechnology products should be regulated the same way as 
other products—these GE products would fall within existing federal 
statutory authority. After soliciting comments from the public, the final 
version of the OSTP Framework was issued in 1986.47 It followed the 
outlines set forth in 1984 and established assignments based on them. 
The FDA became responsible for the safety of food, feed, food 
additives, and veterinary drugs; the USDA was responsible for safety of 
plants, pests, and veterinary biologic; and the EPA was given authority 
over microbial/plant pesticides, new uses of existing pesticides, and 
novel microorganisms.48 The EPA was to review these subjects as safe 
for the environment and safe for new use of a companion herbicide. 
Following the publication of the Coordinated Framework, the federal 
agencies and the White House continued to work together to devise a 
common strategy for discretionary authority allowed under the various 
statutes. An interagency committee responsible for coordination of 
science policy, the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee 
(BSCC), started to work with the agencies and the OSTP. A consensus 
was not reached and the working papers of the BSCC were sent to the 
 
45 Maurizio G. Paoletti & David Pimentel, Genetic Engineering in Agriculture and the 
Environment, 46 BIOSCIENCE 665, 668 (Univ. of Cal. Press Oct. 1996) (citing Max J. 
Whitten, An International Perspective for the Release of Genetically Engineered 
Organisms for Biological Control, BIOLOGICAL CONTROL BENEFITS AND RISKS 253 
(Heikki M.T. Hokkanen & James M. Lynch eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003)). 
46 See Marden, supra note 43. 
47 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 26, 
1986). 
48 Id. 
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President’s Council on Competitiveness, a group formed under the Bush 
administration.49 
The Council then established an Ad Hoc Committee on Scope which 
published Principles for Federal Oversight of Biotechnology: Planned 
Introduction Into the Environment of Organisms with Modified 
Hereditary Traits, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,118 (proposed July 31, 1990). The 
Ad Hoc Committee included representatives of the federal agencies as 
well as other individuals. The draft policy statement devised a common 
statement of the basis for exercising oversight within the scope of 
discretionary authority under the statutes. The proposal placed the 
burden of proving the existence of hazards upon those who raised the 
complaint about hazards. The complainant had to show, based on 
scientific evidence, that the existence of the hazards outweighed the 
benefits of the biotechnology.  
In August 1990, the Bush administration published Four Principles of 
Regulatory Review for Technology, an approval of principles to guide 
the use of oversight. The first part of this Declaration read: 
(1) Federal government regulatory oversight should focus on the 
characteristics and risks of the biotechnology product—not the 
process by which it is created. . . . 
(2) For biotechnology products that require review, regulatory 
review should be designed to minimize regulatory burden while 
assuring protection of public health and welfare. . . . 
(3) Regulatory programs should be designed to accommodate the 
rapid advances in biotechnology. . . . 
(4) In order to create opportunities for the application of innovative 
new biotechnology products, all regulation in environmental and 
health areas—whether or not they address biotechnology—should 
use performance standards rather than specifying rigid controls or 
specific designs for compliance.50 
The evaluation of hazards became one of burden of proof. The 
principle of a precautionary approach (“precautionary principle”)51 was 
 
49 Marden, supra note 43. 
50 Restated in Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned 
Introductions of Biotechnology Products into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg. 6753-01, 6760 
(Feb. 27, 1992). How engineered genes affect the genome is largely unknown. The process 
includes the use of vectors, promoters, and bacterial genes. See generally, CLAIRE HOPE 
CUMMINGS, UNCERTAIN PERIL: GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE FUTURE OF SEEDS 12–17 
(2008). 
51 In January 2000, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was approved at the Montreal 
negotiating round of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The language of the 
protocol endorsed the precautionary principle. Frederick H. Buttel, The Global Politics of  
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rejected. The precautionary principle has two major components. The 
first is a “shift in the burden of proof from governmental regulatory 
agencies to private firms . . .”; the private firms are obligated to prove 
that the new product is safe.52 The second is that “products or 
practices can be rejected if there is evidence of any harm or if there is 
a plausible scientific rationale that approval could lead to negative 
health or environmental effects.”53 
In February 1991, the Council of Competitiveness published its 
Report on National Biotechnology Policy.54 The Report specified that in 
order to not inhibit growth, the government should presume that a 
product poses a minimal risk in the absence of any evidence to the 
contrary. On this basis, the administration would seek to eliminate 
unneeded regulatory burdens on all phases of the development of new 
biotechnology products, experiments, product development, sales, and 
use.55 
The Final Statement of Scope stated that federal oversight should be 
limited to science-based risk assessment to “ensure the safety of planned 
introductions of biotechnology products into the environment while not 
unduly inhibiting the benefits of such introductions.”56 
The stated rationale for this approach was that “[p]roducts developed 
through biotechnology processes do not per se pose risks to human 
health and the environment; risk depends instead on the characteristics 
and use of individual products.”57 Further, the policy stated that when 
review is deemed necessary it “should be designed to minimize 
regulatory burden while assuring protection of public health and 
welfare.”58 Agencies’ regulation should be designed “to accommodate 
the rapid advances in biotechnology.”59 
 
GEOs, in ENGINEERING TROUBLE: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 152, 163 
(Rachel A. Schurman & Dennis Doyle Takahashi Kelso eds., 2003). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS. REPORT ON NATIONAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY 11 (1991), available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id 
=umn.31951003088116i [hereinafter BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT]. 
55 Id. 
56 Exercise of Fed. Oversight Within the Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned 
Introductions of Biotechnology Prods. Into the Env’t, 57 Fed. Reg. 6753, 6755 (Feb. 27, 
1992). 
57 Id. at 6756. 
58 Id. at 6760 (citing the August 1990 Four Principles of Regulatory Review for 
Biotechnology). 
59 Id. 
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This approach to risk was chosen because it “is scientifically sound, 
properly protects public health and the environment against risk, and 
avoids hindering safe innovations.”60 It relied on five conclusions from 
The National Research Council’s review: 
1. The same physical and biological laws govern the response of 
organisms modified by modern molecular and cellular methods 
and those produced by classical methods. 
2. Information about the process used to produce a genetically 
modified organism is . . . not a useful criterion for determining 
whether the product requires less or more oversight. 
3. No conceptual distinction exists between genetic modification 
of plants and microorganisms by classical methods or by 
molecular techniques . . . . 
4. Crops modified by molecular and cellular methods should pose 
risks no different from those modified by classical methods for 
similar traits . . . . 
5. In many respects, molecular methods resemble the classical 
methods for modifying particular strains of microorganisms, 
but . . . [are] even more useful than the classical methods.61 
The final Scope principles announced are: 
1. A determination to exercise oversight within the scope of 
discretion afforded by statute should not turn on the fact that an 
organism has been modified or modified by a particular process 
or technique, because such fact is not alone a sufficient 
indication of risk. 
2. A determination to exercise oversight in the [s]cope of 
discretion afforded by statute should be based on evidence that 
the risk presented by introduction of an organism in a particular 
environment used for a particular type of application is 
unreasonable. 
3. Organisms with new phenotypic trait(s) conferring no greater 
risk to the target environment than the parental organisms 
should be subject to a level of oversight no greater than that 
associated with the unmodified organisms.62 
 
60 Id. at 6755. 
61 Id. at 6756. 
62 Id. 
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B.  Developments in the Office of Trademarks and Patents After 
Chakrabarty 
Immediately following Chakrabarty, the Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO) would not allow general utility patents on plants, 
assuming a congressional intent in the enactment of the two plant 
statutes to preclude subject matter validity.63 Challenges to this policy 
were brought. In Ex Parte Hibberd, the Board of Patent Appeals 
overruled the rejection and refused to accept the PTO’s interpretation of 
congressional intent.64 The PTO began issuing patents upon plants under 
35 U.S.C. 101 after Hibberd.65 
In 1984, the PTO granted a patent on a mouse that was particularly 
prone to cancer, the “oncomouse.”66 In 1987, the PTO announced it 
would accept applications for “nonnaturally occurring” organisms as 
long as the “invention” had a “new form, quality, properties or 
combination not present in the original article existing in nature in 
accordance with existing law.”67 
“[T]he PTO began issuing patents on human genes and gene 
fragments, transgenic bacteria that express human genes, and human cell 
lines that express DNA sequences producing pharmacologically 
important proteins and that perform other important biological 
functions.”68 The PTO allowed “the patenting of (1) the genomes and 
DNA sequences of plants; (2) the genomes and DNA sequences of 
bacteria, animals, and other living organisms; and (3) the DNA 
sequences of human beings, but not the entire genome of [human] or 
human-like being[s].”69 
In 1994, the PTO began rejecting patents for small gene fragments 
known as express gene sequence tags (ESTs). In 1995, the PTO 
announced a new “credible” utility standard, as opposed to the 
 
63 Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Hellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel 
and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 
319 (2002). 
64 227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (C.C.P.A. 1985). 
65 Demaine & Hellmeth, supra note 63. 
66 U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984); Demaine & Hellmeth, supra note 63, at 
318. 
67 1077 Off. Gaz. Pat. & Trademark Office 24 (Apr. 7, 1987). 
68 Demaine & Hellmeth, supra note 63. 
69 Id. 
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substantial utility standard.70 A few years later, the PTO announced it 
would allow patents on ESTs based on their capability to act as probes. 
On December 21, 1999, the PTO issued new utility examination 
guidelines.71 Under the new guidelines, one specific utility shown in the 
application would be sufficient.72 
III 
THE COURT’S DECISION IN J.E.M. AG SUPPLY 
The developments discussed above preceded the Court’s life-form 
ruling, which has allowed utility patents to be granted for hybridized 
plants. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. 
resolved the question of whether there was a distinction between 
microbes and plants for subject matter approval in the light of the two 
special plant statute enactments.73 The majority decision followed 
Chakrabarty in rejecting the doctrine that patents from forms of life are 
repugnant to access to the commons.74 
The ability to patent sequences of DNA for specific functions in 
forms of life is an open matter. A district court has ruled that the 
product-of-life exception precludes patents for gene purification and 
isolation of natural sequences with detriment to upstream research.75 
The Department of Justice filed its amicus curiae brief in Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology, urging that the copying of the DNA of genes is 
ineligible subject matter.76 It used a “magic microscope” test: if the 
isolated DNA could be seen from a supposed microscope after it is 
isolated, it still remains a form of nature.77 The Report addresses the 
undesirable impacts of allowing patents for genetic testing. It 
promotes a change in the patent statute to exclude patents from 
 
70 PTO Examination Guidelines on Utility Requirement, 50 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. 
(BNA) 295, 303 (July 20, 1995). 
71 Revised Utility Examination Guidelines; Request for Comments, 64 Fed. Reg. 71440 
(Dec. 21, 1999). 
72 See Part IV B, infra. 
73 534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
74 Id. 
75 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, v. U.S. PTO, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), 
rev’d, in part, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d 1398 (2011); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) 
(recognizing phenomena of nature as unpatentable subject matter, rejecting the patenting of 
algorithms, requiring the narrowing of claims which would otherwise preempt wide swaths of 
technological development). 
76  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d 1398. 
77 Id. 
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infringement research and the sale of tests when allied to health 
care.78 
In J.E.M., the Patent Office supported the patent holder.79 The facts 
of the case do not necessarily involve the fundamental public good issue 
of irremediable impact on the environment by privately held patents. 
The development of hybrids through selective breeding, which accepts 
entire genomes, allows nature to be the force determining the 
acceptability of the new hybrid. Genetic engineering, in contrast, forces 
the entry of the chosen gene or genes into the genome. This forced entry 
immediately raises the requirement for long-term scientific analysis of 
the effects of genetic engineering on the environment and human health. 
Patents allow control of the effects by multinational corporations who 
possess enormous capital. As seen herein, control of the seed by patent 
changes the farmer from a breeder to a consumer. The Court framed the 
decision on the arguments advanced by the infringer of a plant utility 
patent.80 The central claim was the proof of congressional intent based 
on the two special plant statutes. The issues of control of seeds and life-
forms were decided under the separation of powers approach. A specific 
provision of the Plant Variety Protection Act allows the farmer control 
over the seeds and allows for research on the plant form under patent 
protection.81 The defendant was accused of infringement in the sale of 
hybrid corn seeds that had been patented as a general utility invention.82 
Since Congress had the power to allow patents for living matter and had 
never excepted any form of matter, the Court ascribed to Congress the 
intent to allow patents for products from nature. 
The Court noted that the PTO had issued utility patents for 
hybridizing plants and that there had been 1800 of such patents issued 
since 1985. Most of these patents, then, were issued following White 
House action and pursuant to the PTO guidelines previously discussed. 
Most of these patents involved transgenic seeds or plants. However, the 
Court did not consider the utility requirement for transgenic plants. That 
matter must await decision. The Court did notice the lack of argument 
under the utility standard in the pending case. 
 
78 Id. 
79 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. 124. 
80 Id. 
81 7 U.S.C. §§ 2543, 2544. 
82 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. 124. 
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IV 
PLANT GMOS SHOULD BE PROCESSED BY THE PATENT OFFICE 
UNDER THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
A.  Hazards 
Since “utility” was not involved in J.E.M., it becomes another 
important area of attention. There is no doubt that utility is embedded in 
35 U.S.C. § 101, which requires that a patentable invention be “new and 
useful.” 
Scientists, organic farmers, nonprofit organizations, and 
environmentalists have raised the question of possible adverse 
consequences involved in the genetic engineering of plants.83 Negative 
warnings from these sources include (1) gene flow allowing invasions 
of organic fields;84 (2) the reaction to the genetically engineered gene(s) 
and developments by weeds or insects to attain tolerance, allowing ever 
resistant weeds or insects;85 (3) decreased biodiversity from the 
introduction of genetically engineered seeds or plants, which, directly or 
through wild relatives, may cause a substantial displacement of either 
flora or fauna with the resulting destruction of land races developed over 
millennia;86 (4) the contamination of all seed supplies in significant 
amounts;87 and (5) decreased yields.88 Determining the validity and 
 
83 See, e.g., MARC LAPPE & BRITT BAILEY, AGAINST THE GRAIN (1998); Ronnie 
Cummins, Hazards of Genetically Engineered Food and Crops: Why We Need A Global 
Moratorium, IN MOTION MAGAZINE (Aug. 29, 1999), http://www.inmotionmagazine.com 
/geff4.html; PAUL LURQUIN, HIGH TECH HARVEST (2002); William Boyd, Wonderful 
Potencies, in ENGINEERING TROUBLE 24 (2003); Allison Wilson, Genome Scrambling—Myth 
or Reality?, ECONEXUS (Oct. 2004), http://www.econexus.info/publication/genome                  
-scrambling---myth-or-reality; Transformation-induced mutations in transgenic crop plants, 
ECONEXUS, www.econexus.info (2004); Gillam, supra note 32; Keith Aoki, Seed Wars 
(Carolina Academic Press 2008); CUMMINGS, supra note 50; UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS, Gone to Seed (2004), www.ucsusa.org/food_and_agriculture/science_and 
_impacts/impacts_genetic_engineering/gone-to-seed.html. See discussion of letter of Dr. Don 
Huber, plant scientist, formerly at Purdue University to the USDA, January 2011, asserting the 
discovery of disease causing microorganisms in GE corn and soybeans; entry allowed by 
glyphosate. Dr. Huber claims that the mysterious organism and weakened defense caused by 
glyphosate accounts for unexplained epidemics of disease, the sudden death syndrome of 
soybean crops and Goss’ wilt on corn. Dr. Huber’s findings have not been verified by outside 
scientists nor published in a peer reviewed journal. See Melanie Warner, Mystery Science: 
More Details On The Strange Organism That Could Destroy Monsanto, (May 5, 2011), 
www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-44043052/mystery-science-more-details-on-the-strange 
-organism-that-could-destroy-monsanto/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2011). 
84 See Geertson, 570 F.3d 1130. 
85 See LAPPE & BAILEY, supra note 83; CUMMINGS, supra note 50, pp. 445-46. 
86 LAPPE & BAILEY, supra note 83 at 97–98, 101–03. 
87 GONE TO SEED, supra note 11. 
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extent of these risks is difficult because patent holders have the right to 
(and do) protect knowledge of their tests and prevent research.  
The use of glyphosate, as asserted above, produces other alleged 
hazards. These hazards include (1) harms to exposed nontarget 
organisms, especially aquatic forms;89 (2) interference with estrogen 
biosynthesis enzymes in human placental cells;90 (3) increased 
susceptibility of plants to disease;91 (4) increased appearance of root 
fungal disease;92 (5) the development of neural defects and craniofacial 
malformations in amphibians;93 (6) microbial ecosystem disturbance 
with subsequent unwanted effects upon beneficial microbes;94 (7) an 
increase in bile acids, which suggests toxicity in the liver and its 
detoxifying system;95 (8) the introduction of “inert” toxic surfactants, 
including polyethyloxylated tallow amine, which constitute fifty-nine 
percent of the Roundup compound;96 (9) the inhibition of 
monooxygenases that mammals need to detoxify other chemicals that 
 
88 LAPPE, supra note 83 at 81. 
89 See, e.g., Bette Hileman, Common Herbicide Kills Tadpoles, CHEMICAL & 
ENGINEERING NEWS, Apr. 11, 2005, at 11, available at 
http://pubs.acs.org/cen/news/83/i15 /8315notw8.html. 
90 Sophie Richard et. al., Differential Effects of Glyphosate and Roundup on Human 
Placental Cells and Aromatase, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 716, 720 (2005) 
(“Roundup may be thus considered as a potential endocrine disruptor. Moreover, at higher 
doses still below the classical agricultural dilutions, its toxicity on placental cells could 
induce some reproduction problems.”). 
91 Gillam, supra note 32. 
92 Id. See also Stephen O. Duke et al., Herbicide Effects on Plant Disease, 18 PEST 
MGMT. SCI. 36 (2007). 
Herbicides have the potential to affect plant disease by several Mechanisms. These 
secondary effects of herbicides have not been sufficiently studied to fully 
understand their environmental toxicology implications or for an adequate 
knowledge of them to enhance integrated past management. This information is 
especially important in the context of biocontrol of weeds with plant pathogens. 
93 See also R.A. Relyea, The Lethal Impacts of Roundup and Predatory Stress on Six 
Species of North American Tadpoles, 48 ENV’T CONTAMINATION AND TOXICOLOGY 351, 
355 (2004). 
Roundup with the POEA surfactant has the potential to play a major 
role in amphibian declines. However, it is worthy to note that the 
manufacturer of Roundup (Monsanto Corp.) has recently released an 
additional formulation of glyphosate (Roundup Biactive) which 
contains a different (but unspecified) surfactant that is reported to be 
less toxic Tsui and Chu 2003. 
94 LAPPE & BAILEY, supra note 83, at 60. 
95 Id. at 54. 
96 Id. 
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may be attributed to the possible disruption of the cellular membrane;97 
(10) indications of manganese deficiencies in (GT) soybeans;98 (11) 
concerns that heavy meat eaters may be exposed to Roundup Ready 
soybean hulls digested by livestock, which allow bacteria to metabolize 
glyphosate into a more fat soluble and toxic amine that could, in theory, 
accumulate in body tissues;99 and (12) the lack of knowledge of the 
formation of neo-allergens harmful to humans.100 In fact, statistics from 
the California Environmental Protection Agency’s Pesticide Illness 
Surveillance Program indicate that glyphosate has the highest number of 
all pesticides for health-related incidents.101 All of these hazards raise a 
considerable demand that the FDA require the labeling of GE 
foods.102Monsanto offers a website to counter many of these claims.103 
Pleas have been made to the EPA that human exposure to glyphosate 
poses unreasonable risks and has led to crop resistance. These 
organizations requested that the EPA disallow glyphosate and Roundup 
registration.104 
Another area of concern involves the use of university research by 
corporations for agricultural projects. Bioengineering patents further the 
development of an industrial-university nexus allowing for penetration 
of university research by corporations with conflicting objectives.105 
Patents raise a conflict of interest between the search for knowledge and 
the overseeing of large agricultural projects for commercial objectives. 
 
97 Id. 
98 Gillam, supra note 32. 
99 LAPPE & BAILEY, supra note 83, at 55. 
100 Lurquin, supra note 83 (Studies show that allergens are not present in corn and 
canola due to their genetically altered status. He advocates labeling to assist persons with 
allergy problems.); LAPPE & BAILEY, supra note 83, at 136. 
101 See Daniel A. Goldstein, et. al., An Analysis of Glyphosate Data from the California 
Environmental Protection Agency Pesticide Illness Surveillance Program, 40 J. 
TOXICOLOGY, CLINICAL TOXICOLOGY, 885, 885–92 (2002). 
102 Rachel A. Schurman & William A. Munro, Making Biotech History: Social 
Resistance to Agricultural Biotechnology and the Future of the Biotechnology Industry, in 
ENGINEERING TROUBLE: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 111, 120 (Rachel A. 
Schurman & Dennis Doyle Takahasha Kelso eds., 2003). 
103 Roundup/Glyphosate Background Materials, MONSANTO.COM, (last visited Sept. 
26, 2011), http://www.Monsanto.com/products/Pages/roundup-safety-background               
-materials.aspx. 
104 See, e.g., Letter from Beyond Pesticides et. al., to Office of Pesticide Programs, 
Environmental Protection Agency (Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://www.beyond 
pesticides.org/documents/glyphosate-final9-21-1.pdf. 
105 See, e.g., Patent and Trademark Law Amendments (Bayh-Dole) Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–
212 (2006). 
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As seen above, there exists a lack of knowledge concerning the effect 
of GMO foods on human health. In the distinct area of social effects, GE 
patents raise the need for strict control by the patent owner of the seeds 
licensed to farmers and allow monopoly control.106 
B.  The Requirement of Successful Conclusion 
Courts were concerned with “utility” prior to the mid-1980s. The 
Court of Patent Appeals faced applications upon the newly discovered 
release of energy from splitting atoms in In re Chilowsky.107 The court 
laid down a three part test for proof of operability: (1) where operation is 
readily understood and conforms to known laws of science, 
operativeness may be presumed; (2) where there appears to be a conflict 
with scientific principles, very clear evidence is required to overcome 
the possibility; and (3) where testing is not available, it is incumbent on 
the applicant to demonstrate the workability and utility of the device and 
make clear the principles on which it operates.108 
Applying the tests of Chilowsky to GE plants, proponents would be 
required to respond to concerns about the ability of plants to naturally 
adapt to new environments and the principles of outcrossing, 
backcrossing, and pollination.109 It was predictable that implanted 
transgenic genes would have impacts on the environment; Chilowsky 
now requires patent seekers to discuss this impact. 
Then came Brenner v. Manson.110 In Brenner, the Court held that a 
patent is not a reward for the search but compensation for only a 
substantial utility.111 The Court directed its statement to the ruling of the 
Court of Custom and Patent Appeals (CCPA), below, that any chemical 
process resulting in a product dispensed with a showing of utility. 
Starting from the premise that patents can only issue if not injurious to 
the public good, the Court stated that the rewards for an invention can 
 
106 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Monsanto 
Co. V. Scrubbs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 854 (N.D. Miss. 2004); Monsanto Co. v. Trantham, 156 
F. Supp. 2d 855 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) (holding that seeds may not be saved by farmers nor 
can the seeds be used for research). 
107 229 F.2d 457 (C.C.P.A. 1956). 
108 Id. 
109 Cummings, supra note 50. The USDA expressed surprise when genes from 
Roundup Ready creeping bentgrass at an experimental test site in Oregon had pollinated 
plants thirteen miles away. 
110 383 U.S. 519 (1966). 
111 Id. at 535–37. 
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only be granted for a “successful conclusion.”112 Brenner does not allow 
patents for experiments that tolerate harmful and unreliable results. The 
Court stated that “[t]he basic quid pro quo contemplated by the 
Constitution and Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit 
derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility.”113 
Unless benefits are derived by the public from the invention with 
substantial certainty, the statute disallows the patent.114 “[A patent] is 
not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful 
conclusion.”115 
The benefits advanced by seekers of GE seed patents are countered 
by studies that claim that failures limit the benefits only to the very 
short-term. First, those that claim that the glyphosate resistant trait 
reduces use of other more toxic herbicides must acknowledge the arrival 
of superweeds, which arise from the extended and substantial use of 
glyphosate. Currently, chemical companies advocate the use of more 
toxic chemicals to combat superweeds. The Wall Street Journal 
interviewed representatives of chemical companies who speak of the 
need for and development of new chemicals and GE traits to protect 
crops from superweeds. Dow AgroSciences sells such a chemical, 2,4-
D, and genetically engineers specific tolerance. However, in 2008, the 
Natural Resources Defense Council petitioned the EPA to ban 2,4-D 
alleging the chemical is an endocrine disruptor with predicted human 
health risks, including changes in estrogen and testosterone levels, 
thyroid problems, prostate cancer, and reproductive abnormalities.116 
2,4-D has been banned in Norway as an impairment to human health 
and the environment.117 Monsanto recommends this herbicide as a mix 
with Roundup when resistance to glyphosate is suspected.118 Second, as 
to Monsanto’s claim that GT plants allow a decrease of undesirable land 
tillage, studies have shown that superweeds create the need for greater 
 
112 Id. at 534–37. 
113 Id. at 534. 
114 See generally, id. at 534–35. 
115 Id. at 536. 
116 Jennifer Sass, NRDC Petitions EPA to Ban 2,4-D: An Agent Orange Chemical 
Doesn’t Belong on Lawns, JENNIFER SASS’S BLOG (Nov. 6, 2008), http://switchboard.nrdc 
.org/blogs/jsass/nrdc_files_a_legal_petition_to.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2011). 
117 Declaration of William Freese, Geertson Seed Farms v. Mike Johanns, et al., (N.D. Cal. 
2006) No. C-06-1075 CRB, ¶ 10. 
118 See Technology Development, by Monsanto, Roundup Ready Plus Weed 
Management Solutions, Management Options for Common Groundsel and Yellow Rocket 
at Z, FIELDER’S CHOICE DIRECT (2011), http://www.fielderschoicedirect.com/wp-content 
/uploads/2011/04/RRPLUS%E2%84%A2-Common-Groundsel-and-Yellow-Rocket.pdf. 
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efforts for elimination, including tillage.119 Third, the claim that GT 
plants allow for an effective increase in profits to farmers and substantial 
decrease in labor required for chemical use is in dispute. Organic 
farmers, including the plaintiffs in Geertson, have urged that the record 
regarding GT alfalfa disproves profitability. The Wall Street Journal 
article reports a backlash by farmers against the steep prices charged by 
Monsanto for GT seeds.120 Monsanto’s profits on the sale of its GT 
seeds have recently risen after a policy of price-cutting and a focus on 
volume.121 
The PTO’s practice of allowing a patent on the showing of one 
specific, substantial, and credible utility, without balance, needs 
reassessment.122 The continual granting of plant patents by the PTO 
following Hibberd, as emphasized in J.E.M., would not necessarily have 
required “successful conclusion.”123 The guidelines do not demand tests 
alleviating the hazards raised here. 
Analogous issues have been decided on rulings requiring a showing 
of de minimis hazards or the ability to prevent them.124 Application of 
Sichert states that the test is one of balancing risks.125 Patents are not to 
be issued if they present hazards. If the contingency of harm is minimal, 
however, and can be alleviated by proper application from those skilled 
in the art, there would be a showing of sufficient safeguards to justify 
acceptance. 
The admissions in Geertson that the use of RRA requires special 
conditions, special barriers, special recommendations for tillage, special 
use of glyphosate, and special seed cleaning acknowledge dangers from 
GE seeds. Patent policy under these patents deputizes the patent holder 
to enforce the patent and requires the organic farmer to cooperate with 
those policies. Such a principle seems foreign to Anglo-Saxon tort law, 
which raises liability for negligence, trespass, and nuisance from those 
who allow drift upon another’s land.126 
 
119 Id.; Second Declaration, supra note 1. 
120 Kilman, supra note 5. 
121 Ian Berry, Monsanto’s Seeds Sow a Profit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2011, at B3. 
122 See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-02 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
123 See generally J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. 124. 
124 Application of Sichert, 566 F.2d 1154, 1159–60 (C.C.P.A. 1977), citing In re Anthony, 
414 F.2d 1383, 1394–95 (C.C.P.A. 1969) and In re Hartop, 311 F.2d 249 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
125 Id. 
126 Jacobs Farm v. Western Farm Serv. Inc., 190 Cal. App. 4th 1502, 1524–25 (Cal. 
App. 2010). 
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It is often asserted, as in Application of Sichert, that concern for the 
potentially injured is not placed on the PTO but on agencies specifically 
granted jurisdiction over harmful products. “Utility” includes 
nonhazardous process or product and substantial benefit for the public 
good. The Patent Statute places responsibility for public good on the 
PTO.127 Reward for innovation can only occur when each and every 
requirement of the Statute is met. Graham v. John Deere Co. states that: 
The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach 
the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. Nor may 
it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, 
advancement or social benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress 
may not authorize the issuance of patents, whose effects are to 
remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict 
free access to materials already available. Innovation, advancement, 
and the things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are 
inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional 
command must “promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.” This is 
the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be 
ignored. And it is in this light that patent validity “requires 
reference to a standard written into the Constitution.”128 
There is manifest conflict between a standard calling for reward for 
only successful conclusion and a standard allowing reward for the 
showing of a single utility without consideration of the detriments. 
C.  The Study by the National Research Council 
The National Research Council has published The Impact of 
Genetically Engineered Crops on Farm Sustainability in the United 
States.129 Its summary findings would not support the contention that 
GE patents meet the utility standard of successful conclusion. The key 
findings show that all the preliminary successes are qualified. Finding 
No. 1 states that glyphosate is less toxic than other herbicides, but 
warns that its predominance reduces its effectiveness as a weed 
management tool.130 Finding No. 2 allows for conservation tillage, but 
finds that farmers who use GE seeds are bent to such practice.131 
 
127 See Application of Hartop, 311 F.2d 249, 263–66 (C.C.P.A 1962) (Worley, J. 
dissenting). 
128 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (quoting A&P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 
(MSG) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
129 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL NAT’L ACAD. PRESS, THE IMPACT OF 
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS ON FARM SUSTAINABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2010). 
130 Graham, 383 U.S. at 4.2(a). 
131 Id. at 5. 
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Finding No. 4 is concerned with gene flow to organic farmers, and it 
warns of the problems of further gene flow upon the use of more GE 
traits.132 Finding No. 7 indicates that the effect of GE crops on prices 
is not understood.133 Finding No. 8 finds that the economic effect of 
GE crops has not received adequate research.134 Finding No. 8 also 
finds both favorable and unfavorable social impacts and again states 
that GE crops need further study.135 Finding No. 10 states that there 
has been little research on how increasing market concentration of 
seed suppliers affects overall yield benefits, crop genetic diversity, 
seed prices, and farmers’ planting decisions and options.136 
In its conclusions, the report states that weed problems will become 
more common as weeds develop resistance to herbicides.137 The 
infrastructure to track environmental benefits is not in place; studies 
are needed to evaluate environmental and economic effects. As more 
genetic engineering develops, such studies are ever more important. 
The report’s final summary conclusion accords benefits to farmers 
when GE traits are used properly, but suggests a “targeted and 
tailored regulatory approach to GE-trait development and 
commercialization that meets human and environmental safety 
standards while minimizing unnecessary expenses . . . .”138 
The justification for monopoly by patent is the ability of scientists 
or inventors to have knowledge of the art to allow for beneficial post 
expiration uses. The failures, shown by field use of the GT patents, 
create heavy concerns regarding the impact of GE plants on 
agriculture. 
CONCLUSION 
Real world developments show that genetic engineering of 
agricultural products is experimental. Such patent applications tinker 
with life forces, thus requiring long-term analysis for all 
environmental and human health risks. Impact levels as set forth by 
Whitten should be considered. The precautionary principle should be 
adopted. Control of agriculture by patents is a fundamental issue, 
 
132 Id. at 8. 
133 Id. at 10. 
134 Id. at 11. 
135 Graham, 383 U.S. 11. 
136 Id. at 12. 
137 See Biotechnology Report, supra note 53. 
138 NAT’L ACAD. PRESS, supra note 128, at 15. 
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which should rank very high on the matters for the concern of 
Congress. 
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